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This article forms part of the attempt to develop the concept of autonomy of migration as an 
approach that is no longer prone to critique of implicating a romanticisation of migration. 
Drawing on the example of biometric rebordering, it shows in the first part, that it becomes 
pertinent to address the two allegations that drive this major critique, as their warranty 
increases due to the technologisation of border controls. It then introduces a reading of 
autonomy, which emphasises that moments of uncontrollability and excess of migratory 
practices cannot be thought in isolation of the conditions, in which they emerge. The second 
part introduces the notion of the embodied encounter as a transmission channel that mediates 
between the investigation of the situated practices of individual migrants and the assertion of 
an abstract autonomy of migration, thereby efficiently dissolving the two criticisms that have 
been raised against the concept of autonomy of migration. What the adoption of this analytical 
focus affords to acknowledge is, however, that neither migration, nor borders exist as such, 
but are brought into being in the innumerable encounters between people on the move and the 
actors, means and methods of mobility control.   
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This article forms part of the attempt to develop the concept of autonomy of migration (CAM) 
as an approach, which is no longer prone to the critique of implicating a romanticisation of 
migration. As its name suggests, the CAM asserts moments of autonomy of migratory 
practices in regards to any attempt to control or regulate them.
1
 This claim has stirred ongoing 
debates within the antiracist movement. On the one hand, the CAM has been promoted as a 
valuable alternative to the misleading image of the fortress that has dominated antiracist 
campaigns since the 1990s. Instead of representing borders as impenetrable walls, the CAM 
emphasises migrants' capacity to render borders porous as well as the related productivity of 
border controls that are not geared towards the exclusion, but the differential inclusion of 
migrants.
2
 On the other hand, critics accuse the CAM, first, of not sufficiently considering the 
varying conditions, under which migration occurs, and second, of downplaying the repressive 
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effects of border controls. In conjunction, these two allegations fuel the major critique of the 
CAM implicating a romanticisation of migration.
3
 
 In the first part of this article I demonstrate that it becomes pertinent to address these 
two criticisms as their warranty increases in the context of the technologisation of border 
controls in general and their biometrification in particular. Besides implicating a further 
diversification of how the border is experienced, biometric rebordering significantly alters the 
power relations between migrants and border control authorities. I illustrate my arguments 
through the Visa Information System (VIS), one of the largest biometric databases in the 
world. Ultimately, the technologisation of border controls stirs a question: what does the 
assertion of the autonomy of migration refer to in the face of border regimes that try to render 
migrants' bodies as a means of mobility control? I argue that autonomy does not refer to a 
quality inherent to migratory practices, but to the institution of a relation of irreconcilable 
conflict between migration and the attempts to control and regulate it by migrants' practices of 
appropriation of mobility and other resources.  
In the second part, I introduce the notion of embodied encounters as a way to unearth 
this relation of conflict, which mostly plays itself out in the realm of the hidden. The study of 
embodied encounters provides a transmission channel between the practices of particular 
migrants and the assertion of an abstract autonomy of migration, thereby efficiently dissolving 
the two criticisms that have been raised against the CAM. What the adoption of this analytical 
focus affords to acknowledge is, however, that neither migration, nor borders exist as such, 
but are brought into being in the innumerable encounters between people on the move and the 
actors, means and methods of mobility control.  
 
Autonomy of migration within biometric border regimes? 
Following critics, the CAM’s core thesis subsumes the experiences of millions of migrating 
people either under the totalising and therefore empty subject position of ‘the migrants’ or 
under the subjectless abstraction of ‘migration’.4 The lived experiences of migrants are quite 
diverse due to their unequal access to economic, social and cultural resources and their 
differential treatment by border regimes in terms of class, ‘race’, gender.  What is needed in 
light of this critique is then an acknowledgement of the crucial insight of feminist migration 
research that mobility is always embodied and relational.
5
  
It is vital to address this criticism, because the differential treatment of migrants is 
intensified and concealed through the biometrification of border controls. It is intensified, 
because biometrics implicate a shift from border control to body control, which enables to 
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replace systematic checks for the targeted control of those classified as ‘risky’. How the 
biometric border is experienced by whom, is however determined by factors of class, ‘race’ 
and gender. But these discriminations are concealed by biometric technologies, which 
supposedly do not suffer from the prejudices shared by human beings, as they verify a 
person’s claimed identity on the basis of features of its biological body independently of any 
factors, which might be regarded as discriminatory.
6
 Yet, Irma van der Ploeg has succinctly 
shown that biometrics transform the biological body into a machine readable ‘text’, whose 
meaning is contingent upon ‘the context’, in which it is produced, and the relations, which are 
established with other ‘texts’.7 It is through both the social context, in which biometrics are 
deployed, and the comparisons, for which the machine readable texts they produce are used, 
that all forms of discrimination in terms of class, ‘race’ and gender come into play. 
Consequently, the CAM needs to better account for the diversity of migrants’ subject 
positions to be able to critique how ‘[technologically] consolidated identities for some 
produce marginalised locations for others’ within material-semiotic contexts, in which sexist 
and racist practices and discourses are virulent.
8
 What becomes pertinent in the face of 
biometric rebordering is then to develop a reading of autonomy, which allows for a situated 
analysis of migrants’ embodied and therefore diverse encounters with and experiences of 
today’s biometric borders. 
According to the second allegation, the CAM’s proponents glorify migrants as heroes 
of clandestine border crossing without sufficiently acknowledging the efficiency of border 
controls.
9
 Again, it is crucial to address this criticism, because the restrictive effects of border 
controls intensify through their technologisation.  
One of the purposes of the VIS is, for instance, to facilitate the re-identification’ of 
visa-overstayers. In the case of re-identification a newly generated fingerprint template is 
compared to the up to 70 million fingerprint templates stored in the VIS.
10
 The apprehended 
person is then reidentified on the basis of the alphanumerical data, which is linked to the 
fingerprint template that has been generated, when the person initially applied for a visa. 
Consequently, concealing one’s identity in order to forestall a deportation is no longer just a 
matter of destroying one’s passport. Rather, visa-overstayers are now haunted by their data 
doubles: If their fingerprints are stored in the VIS, it just takes authorities a few hours to 
establish their identity and country of origin. Hence, the latter no longer rely on migrants' 
cooperation, because the data doubles that are fixed to their bodies by means of biometrics 
replace their narratives as a source of truth.
 11
 What this example highlights is that biometric 
rebordering alters the power relations between migrants and border control authorities to such 
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an extent that the general assertion of moments of autonomy of migration within any border 
regime regardless of its legal, material and technological composition becomes, in fact, a 
highly problematic claim. Ultimately, biometric rebordering stipulates a question: What does 
the notion of autonomy refer to in the context of biometric border regimes, which try to turn 
migrants' bodies into a means of mobility control? 
The example of biometric rebordering demonstrates that border regimes have become 
so pervasive and intrusive that a rethinking of autonomy has to go beyond its Greek 
etymology of self-legislation as well as beyond its popular reading as self-determination. In 
order to emphasise that moments of autonomy of migration can not be thought in isolation of 
the governmental regimes, in which they emerge, I follow Ranabir Samaddar’s proposal to 
read autonomy as governmentality’s other.12 While the notion of governmentality stresses that 
government primarily operates through the conduct of conduct of people, it are the moments, 
which exceed and escape these attempts, that I seek to capture with the notion of autonomy. I 
therefore define autonomy as the institution of a relation of irreconcilable conflict between 
migration and the attempts to control and regulate it by migrants' practices of appropriation 
of mobility and other resources.
13
 This reading of autonomy underscores that moments of 
excess, uncontrollability and self-determination of migratory practices only manifest within a 
relation of conflict with techniques of government. It thereby efficiently avoids a misreading 
of autonomy as pure self-determination or self-legislation free of any governmental effects. 
Migrants' practices of appropriation invest border, migration and citizenship regimes 
with a relation conflict by transgressing the limits the latter impose on their access to mobility 
and other resources. But these transgressions do not occur openly, but mostly in the realm of 
the hidden, because it is a precondition for success of practices of appropriation to remain 
undetected.
14
 The underlying reason is that practices of appropriation operate, like the tactics 
described by Michel de Certeau, in an environment they do not own. In consulates people 
willing to move have to behave within the narrow parameters set by the numerous regulations 
defining the Schengen visa regime: they have to provide all the requested documents and 
answer all questions by consular staffs no matter how indiscrete these questions are and, since 
the start of operation of the VIS, have their fingerprints taken. A refusal to comply with any 
of these regulations results in the automatic refusal of a visa. Hence, people willing to move 
have to appropriate mobility in securitising sites, in which open opposition to the manifold 
regulations and obligations seeking to steer their behaviour is no option.
15
 Rather than openly 
contesting these requirements or refusing their fulfilment, the successful appropriation of 
mobility hinges on a convincing performance of compliance with these regulations. Practices 
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of appropriation transgress the parameters of the border regime, but they do so clandestinely. 
From this follows however, that the relation of irreconcilable conflict does not play itself out 
openly, but, just as the practices initiating it, in the realm of the hidden. This feature of the 
relation of conflict stirs two questions that I am going to address now: First, where does this 
relation of conflict manifest itself? And second, how can it be studied? 
 
 
Studying embodied encounters: acknowledging the performativity of borders and migration 
In brief, this relation of irreconcilable conflict manifests in a series of mostly silent struggles 
over the direct appropriation and selective denial of mobility and other resources. In each of 
these struggles this conflict surfaces in a dynamic dialogue of actions between those trying to 
appropriate mobility and those charged with forestalling such attempts. Since people willing 
to move and on the move are compelled to appropriate mobility and other resources within 
and against border regimes, these conflictive dialogues of action take place in their embodied 
encounters with the means and methods of control. Hence, it is through the analysis of these 
embodied encounters that the relation of conflict between migration and the attempts to 
regulate it, and the possible emergence of moments of excess and uncontrollability within this 
relation, the autonomy of migration, can be studied. 
To move to the study of the embodied encounters of people on the move with the 
actors, means and methods of border control in order to unearth the irreconcilable conflict 
between them appears logical, if we define a conflict with Georg Simmel as ‘one of the 
liveliest patterns of interaction, one that is logically impossible to limit to a single participant.’ 
Simmel stresses the integrative dimension of a conflict, which unifies antagonistic forces in a 
relation of mutual opposition surfacing in dynamic interactions between them.
16
 The move 
towards the study of embodied encounters is in line with the CAM’s conception of borders as 
sites of contestation, in which migrants’ practices encounter the methods and devices of 
mobility control, entering a relationship of reciprocal determination.
17
 If people willing to 
move bring themselves into being as both people on the move and as political subjects by 
appropriating what border, migration and citizenship regimes deny them, they do so in their 
embodied encounters with the means and methods of control. What takes place in each of 
these embodied encounters is a conflictive dialogue of actions, in which each action forms 
itself as a reaction to the previous actions of the counterpart; just as it is shaped by the 
possible responses of the counterpart to this action.
18
 And it is this conflictive dialogue of 
actions that I seek to bring out through the study of embodied encounters. 
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Yet, the connotations of an encounter do not only accommodate the relation of conflict 
I seek to foreground with my reading of autonomy, but also moments of creativity and 
indeterminacy within the struggles, in which this conflict manifests. For what ‘[t]he term 
encounter suggests […is] a meeting which involves surprise and conflict.’19 What the 
connotation of 'surprise' permits to stress is that the relationship of reciprocal determination 
between migrants' practices and the means and methods of control is always incomplete and 
that the outcomes of the conflictive dialogues of actions between them are, consequently, not 
determined in advance.  
What I seek to emphasise by speaking of embodied encounters is, in turn, that it is a 
particular person in a particular body who tries to appropriate mobility in her encounters with 
the agents, devices, means and methods of control. These embodied encounters might be 
mediated through other actors (private service providers, travel agents, security firms, etc.) or 
devices (files, digitalised templates, passports etc.), but they always feature a particular 
human body. It is this particular physical body, in which a person willing to move tries to 
appropriate mobility, that also provides the target, and in the case of biometrics also a means, 
for practices of surveillance and control. To stress the embodied nature of people's encounters 
with the means and methods of control underscores both the materiality and situatedness of 
the practices these encounters involve. To emphasise the materiality of contemporary border 
control practices and the always embodied nature of their experience offers, consequently, an 
effective antidote to counter the misreading of biometric technologies as implicating a shift 
towards 'virtual' border controls.
20
 
Hence, the study of embodied encounters, and this is its first advantage, introduces a 
situated analysis of concrete situations. It thereby responds to the two points of critique that 
have been raised against the CAM. On the one hand, the move towards a situated analysis of 
concrete situations, namely embodied encounters, better accounts for are the legal, practical 
and technological specifities of border regimes as well as their impact on people’s chances, 
possibilities and forms of appropriation. Thereby, the investigation of migrants’ embodied 
encounters with particular border regimes in particular sites addresses the critique, whereupon 
the CAM would not sufficiently consider the restrictive effects of ever more sophisticated 
border controls. 
On the other hand, the investigation of embodied encounters accounts for the insight 
that mobility is always embodied and relational. The forms human mobility takes and the 
experiences it involves are diverse, because it is a particular human body that moves, a body 
which has been classed, raced and gendered.
21
 If autonomy is understood as the institution of 
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a conflict between migration and the attempts to regulate it, then the analysis of people's 
embodied encounters with the means and methods of mobility control unravels the diversity 
of the practices, through which people willing to move try to appropriate mobility, thereby 
initiating that conflict. How particular subjects appropriate mobility and what forms their 
struggles take is shaped, but not entirely determined by their varying access to resources, the 
different degrees of racist and sexist discriminations they have to endure and, finally, the 
particular design and composition of the governmental regimes within and against which they 
struggle. Thereby, the investigation of embodied encounters introduces a situated reading of 
autonomy, as it implies the adoption of ‘politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, 
and situating', favouring ‘the view from a body, always a complex, contradictory, structuring, 
and structured body, versus the view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity’.22 
Nevertheless, and this is its second advantage, the study of the embodied encounters 
efficiently bridges the tension between particular practices, struggles and experiences of 
embodied subjects and general conclusions about the autonomy of migration. To be sure, an 
analytical focus on embodied encounters insists on embodied, situated knowledge. But this 
does not imply to get stuck in a detailed investigation of ‘empirical’ practices of migrants, as 
feared by the existing literature on ethnographic border regime analysis.
23
 For ‘encounters 
between embodied subjects always hesitate between the domain of the particular – the face-
to-face of this encounter – and the general – the framing of the encounter by broader 
relationships of power and antagonism. The particular encounter hence always carries traces 
of those broader relationships.’24 
Whereas, the study of people's embodied encounters with the means and methods of 
mobility control in particular sites allows to unravel, how attempts to govern and appropriate 
mobility play themselves out differently in each encounter, it equally permits to unearth 
broader dynamics in the government of mobility and the forms peoples' struggles take. Put 
simply, the notion of the encounter grasps that a visa applicant encounters a particular staff in 
a particular consulate with a distinct mode of processing visa applications, but at the same 
time she encounters the Schengen visa regime as a whole.  
Thereby, the notion of the encounter provides a much needed transmission channel 
that mediates between the subjective practices of particular migrants and the assertion of an 
abstract autonomy of migration. I would argue that it is precisely the previous lack of a 
methodological mediation between the two that has spurred the critique, whereupon the CAM 
would subsume the varying experiences of millions of migrating people under the subjectless 
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abstraction of migration. To shift the analytical focus on embodied encounters efficiently 
dissolves this critique. 
 The third advantage of the study of embodied encounters is that it forestalls a static 
analysis, which is especially pronounced in studies drawing on the notion of agency. For what 
agency, understood as ‘the socioculturally mediated capacity to act’25 always presupposes, is 
a structure as its external counterpart. The resulting structure-agency divide implicates a static 
analysis, in which structures and agency are investigated in isolation of one another. This 
problem is also not solved by Anthony Giddens' structuration theory, the most elaborate 
attempt to overcome it. Giddens seeks to bridge the divide by attributing a virtual existence to 
structure. Accordingly, structures exist only insofar, as they are constantly re-produced by 
human agents, whose actions they enable and constrain. Hence, structures constitute both the 
‘medium and the outcome of the social practices they recursively organise.’ In order to 
account for this virtual and dual nature of structures, Giddens proposes to study the actions of 
human agents and structural properties simultaneously.
26
 According to critics, Giddens' 
structuration theory rests, however, on a conflation of structure and agency, whose 'logical 
end is a black box of structure-agency dialectics which are impossible to research.' This 
analytical impasse compels researchers, in turn, to accept a methodological and analytical 
dualism of structure and agency.
27
 Yet, by investigating the actions of agents and institutional 
settings separately, these studies treat structures again as the external counterpart of peoples' 
agency. Thereby, they do not only reproduce the structure-agency divide that structuration 
theory denies, but also the static mode of analysis implicated by this divide. 
The study of embodied encounters avoids such a static analysis for the following two 
reasons. First, it places a dynamic relation between two antagonistic forces at the centre of 
analysis, namely a conflict. What the dialogue of action, in which this conflict surfaces, 
highlights is that migrants’ practices of appropriation are inseparably interwoven with the 
means and methods of mobility control. The investigation of embodied encounters therefore 
proceeds transversal to the question of structure and agency.  Instead of confronting people’s 
capacity to act with structural properties imagined as exterior to their practices, the analysis of 
embodied encounters allows to study, how two interacting, but antagonistic forces try to 
engross devices, technologies, regulations, actors and practices for their incommensurable and 
therefore conflictive agendas. The result is a dynamic analysis, in which the technological, 
institutional and legal specifities of a border regime are no longer catalogued in a meticulous 
description in order to be juxtaposed as 'structures' to people's 'agency'. They rather emerge as 
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the contested terrain of and disputed stakes within multiple struggles over the selective denial 
and direct appropriation of mobility and other resources. 
The second, related reason is ontological. To investigate encounters does not imply to 
assume a meeting of two pre-established entities like a ‘migrant’ and a ‘border’. It rather 
implicates to follow the proposition that it is in and through the encounter that borders and 
migrants come into being as such.
28
 Without borders, there would neither be migration nor 
migrants, but only mobility and people on the move.
29
 Conversely, borders only become 
actualised and discernable, when someone is trying to cross them.
30
 On a less abstract level, 
people willing to move only become intelligible as visa applicants in their embodied 
encounters with the Schengen visa regime at the consulates. Conversely, the Schengen visa 
regime is brought into being in and through each of the countless encounters, in which ‘street-
level-bureaucrats’31 are putting its various devices and regulations into practice in their daily 
interactions with people willing to move. In analogy to Simmel’s premise, whereupon society 
is not a given collection of human beings, but only comes into being through the interactions 
between them,
32
 we can conclude that neither migration nor border regimes do exist as such, 
but are brought into being in and through the daily encounters between people on the move 
and those charged with controlling their mobility. Thereby, the study of embodied encounters 
induces a shift from a static analysis of structures and agents to an investigation of the 
performative interactions through which borders and migrants are done. 
The notion of embodied encounters affords to acknowledge, moreover, that borders 
and migration are not performed unilaterally, neither by people on the move nor by the agents 
of control, but in and through the interactions between them. It implies, furthermore, to 
concede that these performances are not deliberate fabrications of the performers involved in 
their production. These performances are not only interrelational, but those staging them are 
also compelled to perform according to particular scripts.
33
 Performativity is 'not a singular 
"act" [performed by a wilful subject]', but the constrained and compulsory 'reiteration of 
norms’ that produces and regulates that to which it refers, while concealing 'the conventions 
of which it is a repetition'.
34
 What distinguishes my approach from previous attempts to make 
Butler's notion of performativity productive for the theorisation of borders and migration
35
 is 
then that I underscore the interrelated and dialogical nature of these performances.  
If the visa application of a young man, who seeks to visit his brother in Europe, is 
rejected, because his 'will to return could not be established', as the most common justification 
for the refusal of a visa states, he is constituted as a 'migrant' though he has never crossed a 
geopolitical border. For his application is rejected, because consular staffs ascribe a 'migration 
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risk' to him. Hence, the consulate emerges as a border, where people willing to move are 
rendered as migrants by consular staffs. The concealed convention that is reiterated through 
the citational practices of consular staffs (e.g. asking questions about the purpose of stay, 
verifying the authenticity of supporting documents, opening a file) and those applying for a 
visa (e.g. organising all requested supporting documents, completing an application form, 
answering consular staffs' questions) is the claimed prerogative of states to control the access 
to their territories.
36
 What this example highlights is that borders and migration are not 
primarily performed through the linguistic citation of norms, but first and foremost through 
'practical or bodily citations' and in 'the bodily subject's encounters with other bodies in the 
world.'
37
 The countless dialogues of actions between people willing to move and those 
charged with controlling their mobility are then performative, because they constitute that to 
which they refer, among others: borders and migration. 
In sum, the study of embodied encounters relates to the agenda of militant research in 
at least three ways: First, it places migrants’ struggles that militant research seeks to unearth 
at the centre of the analysis. In a context, in which borders ‘are no longer situated at the outer 
limits of territories [but] dispersed a little everywhere’,38 the notion of embodied encounters 
permits to trace the performance of borders in those sites and situations, in which conflictive 
dialogues of actions, or in other words struggles, between people on the move and those 
charged with controlling their mobility take place. 
Second, the study of embodied encounters challenges dominant knowledge production 
on human mobility insofar as it reveals its compartmentalisation into separate knowledge 
fields as artificial. Instead of contributing to the fetishisation of (forced, illegal etc.) migration, 
borders or refugees by positing them as given realities waiting to be researched, the study of 
embodied encounters affords to embrace a radical constructivism that highlights the dialogical 
and contested nature of the performances, by which these phenomena are brought into being 
in the first place. Thereby, the study of embodied encounters contributes to the development 
of a political epistemology – a political questioning of the fundamental categories guiding 
much of the current thinking and writing on human mobility.
39
 
Finally, the study of embodied encounters implicates a politicisation of the researcher 
and the research, as it compels researchers to leave the comfort zone of their writing desks. In 
the course of the research, the boundary between participant observation and observant 
participation will inevitably blur. Ultimately, researchers will realise that the knowledge they 
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